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95 N.C. L. REV. 235 (2016)

Are Gray Skies Clearing Up? Shedding Light on Nonprofit
Governance in the Wake of Revamped IRS Form 990*

INTRODUCTION
A 1970s study1 examined the crime rates of two virtually
indistinguishable Texas neighborhoods.2 The control neighborhood
saw a five percent increase in crime, while the treatment
neighborhood experienced a thirty-one percent decrease.3 What was
the independent variable? The treatment neighborhood experienced
a threefold increase in street lighting.4 Numerous subsequent studies
have confirmed what common sense suggests: light tends to dissuade
ill-intentioned people from committing delinquent acts.5 A parallel
principle—that transparency reduces bad corporate governance—is
similarly recognized and accepted.6 As Justice Louis Brandeis
succinctly opined when criticizing opaque and monopolistic
* © 2016 Jordan C. Hilton.
1. Edward B. Lewis & Tommy T. Sullivan, Combating Crime and Citizen Attitudes:
A Study of the Corresponding Reality, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 71, 71–72 (1979).
2. Id. at 73 (“To evaluate the impact of higher intensity illumination on crime, a
statistical comparison of selected criminal activity was developed for the Impact South
Area, an adjacent area with similar demographic characteristics, and the city as a whole.”).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 72.
5. BRANDON P. WELSH & DAVID C. FARRINGTON, EFFECTS OF IMPROVED
STREET LIGHTING ON CRIME, CAMPBELL COLLABORATION 3, 17 (2008), http://www.crim
.cam.ac.uk/people/academic_research/david_farrington/light.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU3R6HWJ] (reviewing thirteen studies of street lighting interventions in the United Kingdom
and United States and finding that crime decreased by twenty-one percent in areas that
experienced street lighting improvements compared to similar areas that did not).
However, it should be noted that the exact effects of literal light on violent and property
crimes are still being debated. Some argue that the effects are too spurious to make causal
claims with any certainty. See Mike Riggs, Street Lights and Crime: A Seemingly Endless
Debate, CITYLAB (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2014/02/street-lightsand-crime-seemingly-endless-debate/8359/ [https://perma.cc/HR4Z-XWV4].
6. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1222 (1999) (“The Securities Act
is strong insofar as publicity is potent; it is weak insofar as publicity is not enough . . . . The
existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential lists and the
like, may be all open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing are few. There is a
shrinking quality to such transactions; to force the knowledge of them into the open is
largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely pursued in private lose their
justification in public. Thus social standards newly defined gradually establish themselves
as new business habits.” (alteration in original) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Federal
Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 55)).
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investment banking practices at the dawn of the twentieth century,
“[s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants.”7
The public’s ability to access relevant information—sunlight—
encourages best practices and transparency. Unfortunately, recent
scandals suggest that—at least regarding nonprofit governance—it is
cloudy far too often. For example, in April 2015, auditors discovered
that Dana Cope, the former executive director of the State
Employees Association of North Carolina (“SEANC”),8 spent nearly
$500,000 of company money on private expenses between 2012 and
2015.9 According to the audit, Cope—the only person to review
annual financial and governance reports10—used SEANC funds to
renovate his home, take a family trip to China, and purchase private
flight lessons.11 Mitch Leonard, the director who replaced Cope,
lamented that the abuses “stem[med] from a culture of
submissiveness, deliberately built over time by Mr. Cope, and
maintained for his own financial benefit. As a result, established
financial controls were compromised, transparency thwarted, and the
truth denied.”12
Unfortunately, director abuse of nonprofit funds is not
extraordinary.13 In 2015, public scandals implicating nonprofit
directors surfaced nationwide.14 As executives15 and commentators16
7. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914). Justice Brandeis called for the public disclosure of commissions and profits
made by bankers to be used as a remedy for unreasonable compensation and as an aid that
investors could use to judge the safety of their investments. Id. at 92–108.
8. SEANC is a 501(c)(5) nonprofit whose stated mission is to protect and enhance
“the rights and benefits of current, retired and future [North Carolina] state employees.”
Mission/Bylaws, SEANC, https://www.seanc.org/mission-bylaws [https://perma.cc/4UMYMMQ8].
9. Joseph Neff, Ex-SEANC Leader Dana Cope Misspent $500k, Audit Finds, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Apr. 11, 2015, 4:34 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news
/politics-government/state-politics/article18281918.html [https://perma.cc/4BBU-XZ72].
10. See infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
11. See Neff, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit
Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (1993) (describing self-dealing by directors
of United Way, the San Diego National Sports Training Foundation, and Boston
University); Melanie B. Leslie, Helping Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law
Can Teach Us About Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 551, 551–52 (2010)
(reviewing several prominent nonprofit scandals).
14. For example, in California, the CEO and other executives of the Chicana Service
Action Center were charged with embezzlement of more than eight million dollars and
conspiracy to commit fraud. David Zahniser & Abby Sewell, Chicana Service Action
Center Executives Charged in $8.5-Million Fraud Case, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2015, 4:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-chicana-services-charges-20150708-story
.html [https://perma.cc/SD4Q-9BKM] (“Prosecutors contend that [the CEO] improperly
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have noted, the wrongdoing in these and myriad other cases is
partially attributable to a lack of good governance procedures and a
dearth of transparency.17 While the current nonprofit governance
reporting scheme deserves some blame for this lack of transparency,
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has recently taken positive
transparency-inducing steps. In 2008, recognizing the inability of
existing deterrents to satisfactorily reduce bad governance18 and in
light of increasingly public nonprofit scandals,19 the IRS addressed the
nonprofit governance issue by enhancing reporting requirements20
contained in IRS Form 990 (“Form 990” or “990”).21 While some
viewed the enhanced 990 as an unfortunate usurpation of directors’
provided herself and her fellow executives salary and compensation packages by creating
fraudulent Board of Directors’ meeting minutes. [The CEO], according to the criminal
complaint, listed several people as being members or board members without the
individuals’ knowledge or permission.”). Scandals also surfaced in Hawaii, Former
Executive Director of Non-Profit Organization Pleads Guilty to Federal Theft Charge, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (June 12, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-hi/pr/former-executive-director-nonprofit-organization-pleads-guilty-federal-theft-charge [https://perma.cc/VQ3J-256N] (stating
that a former executive director pled guilty to embezzling over $150,000), and in
Washington, D.C., Mike Fish, FBI, IRS Investigating Patricia Driscoll, ESPN (June 12, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/13059226/fbi-irs-investigating-kurt-busch-ex-girlfriendpatricia-driscoll [https://perma.cc/BR4Y-BSEA] (reporting that the executive director of
the Armed Forces Foundation self-dealt and falsified/misreported information on Form
990).
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD HITASHI MAYER,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 124 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2015) (“Examples of poor judgment, ethical lapses and outright fraud course
throughout these materials. Nothing so tarnishes the nonprofit sector’s halo than
wrongdoing by charities. More often than not, these actions indicate inadequate corporate
governance procedures and a lack of transparency of the organization’s activities. Good
governance is the implementation of certain principles and policies that should protect the
organization from misconduct.”).
17. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate
Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 347, 362 (2012).
18. As commentators have noted, remedies for breaches of nonprofit directors’ duties
are extremely limited. Id. at 405 (noting that the basic remedies for director misconduct
are action by the state attorney general and the potential for a derivative suit for a
membership nonprofit). While it is possible that potential liability from derivative suits has
some deterrent effect on nonprofit governance, the effect of potential suits on director
behavior is likely marginal. See id. at 411–12.
19. Scandals at United Way, the American Red Cross, and the Nature Conservancy
focused public attention on nonprofit governance. John F. Coverdale, Legislating in the
Dark: How Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt Organizations in Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV. 809, 821–22 (2010).
20. The enhanced reporting requirements are discussed in detail below. See infra
Section I.B.
21. Grace Allison, The New Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations: Revolution in
Progress, 37 EST. PLAN. 14, 14 (2010).
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business judgment,22 most observers generally welcomed the changes
as a signal that nonprofit boards were going to be more thoroughly
scrutinized.23 However, in the years following 990’s enhancement, the
heightened examination of nonprofit governance has produced mixed
results.24
This Recent Development argues that while enhancing the
reporting requirements in Form 990 was a step in the right direction,
the IRS and state governments should do more to illuminate
nonprofit governance practices. Analysis proceeds in four Parts.
Part I outlines the impetus behind 990’s 2008 enhancements and
examines its current disclosure requirements. Part II shows that the
current reporting requirements leave both practical and actual gaps in
public knowledge regarding nonprofit governance. Part III analyzes
solutions and argues that mandating IRS Form 990 e-filing,
participating (on a state-by-state basis) in single portal consortium
initiatives, and enhancing watchdog sites’ reporting practices could
ameliorate the effects of the practical information gap. Part III
22. BONNIE S. BRIER ET AL., ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & GOV’T
ENTITIES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION GOOD
GOVERNANCE ISSUES 1 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 ACT REPORT], https://www.irs.gov/pub
/irs-tege/executive_summary_actgovernancerept.pdf [https://perma.cc/K53T-2S29] (“Charities
can feel pressured to adopt the specified practices, even where it is inadvisable in their
situation, because they believe the IRS or others will consider them poorly governed if
they fail to do so. This then can effectively usurp the judgment of governing boards in
determining what governance practices make sense in their specific context, place undue
burdens on organizations, divert their attention to proxies for governance instead of actual
governance, and adversely impact the unique, diverse, vibrant, and flexible charitable
sector in this country. Accordingly, we believe the IRS should approach this area with
caution.”). Furthermore,
[t]he inclusion of the questions [in Form 990] inherently (and intentionally)
suggests that the IRS supports adoption of specific governance policies and
practices. The danger then is that organizations will take the path of least
resistance and adopt the policies and practices whether or not they are appropriate
for them, or effective in their context.
Id. at 3; see also Karen Donnelly, Comment, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the
Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and
Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 181 (2010) (listing similar concerns to those in the
2008 ACT Report regarding IRS inquiries into specific good governance practices).
23. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit
Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1205 n.113 (2010) (“[T]he IRS has strengthened the
annual 990 Form to require corporations to report self-dealing transactions, which sends a
clear message to those corporations that certain transactions are suspect.”).
24. Id. (noting that Form 990 “may have a desirable effect on boards and may assist
prospective donors in identifying whether the charitable fiduciaries are abusing their
positions[,]” but conceding that “it is unclear if this will increase legal pressure to conform
to fiduciary standards”).
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further argues that, to close the actual information gap, North
Carolina should require certain kinds of nonprofits to annually file
enhanced governance reports. Part IV evaluates counterarguments
and offers recommendations.
I. FORM 990’S INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION
A. Why Form 990 Needed Enhancement
Two major factors behind 990’s 2008 enhancement were (1)
previous versions’ lack of meaningful governance-related disclosure
requirements and (2) contemporary, scandal-begotten public focus on
nonprofit abuses. In 1942, congressional concerns regarding the lack
of nonprofit accountability prompted the IRS to begin requiring some
tax-exempt organizations25 to file annual reports.26 Unfortunately,
many nonprofits were exempt from filing the 99027 and very little, if
any, governance-related information was discernible from these
reports.28 Though Form 990 periodically underwent minor changes, it
remained mostly untouched until 2008.29 Conversely, public
awareness of nonprofit abuses grew drastically during the same
period.30 Scandals at highly regarded nonprofits including United
Way, the American Red Cross, and the Nature Conservancy focused
public (and congressional) attention on nonprofit governance in
25. Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code grants tax-exempt status to qualifying
nonprofits. I.R.C. § 501(c)(a) (2012). Most charitable nonprofits fall in the 501(c)(3)
category. Id. § 501(c)(3). Nonprofits that qualify for tax-exempt status as 501(c)(3) entities
must file form 990. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3)
PUBLIC CHARITIES 8–9, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ZW4GA4].
26. James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 564–65 (2010). Importantly, the IRS reporting does not
mandate that nonprofits adopt governance best practices; it simply requires them to
answer whether they are occurring. See infra Section I.B.
27. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective,
STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 105, app. B at 124 (noting that “religious
organizations, most schools, and publicly supported charitable organizations, were exempt
from [the Form 990] filing requirement”).
28. Fishman, supra, note 26, at 564–65 (noting that the bare-bones report consisted of
“three questions, an income statement, and a balance sheet”).
29. Id. at 566 (“The redesigned Form 990, effective for the 2008 tax year, [was] the
first revision since 1979 and a significant departure from past versions.”).
30. See Diana Aviv, Earning the Public Trust, NONPROFIT Q. (June 21, 2004), https://
nonprofitquarterly.org/2004/06/21/earning-the-public-trust/ [https://perma.cc/HNT7-PZ58]
(“Negative media stories all over the country have detailed examples of alleged excessive
compensation of executives, self-dealing, questionable fundraising practices, conflicts of
interest and lavish expenditures. While these stories refer only to a very limited number of
organizations, the public’s perception of the whole sector is colored by them.”).
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uncomfortable but productive ways.31 The combination of Form 990’s
increasingly apparent impotence and public pressure to effect change
prompted Congress’s eventual overhaul of Form 990 in 2008.32
B.

What Was Added to Form 990

To characterize the IRS’s 2008 changes33 to Form 990 as
“enhancements” probably understates the point.34 Because previous
iterations of Form 990 left governance-related questions largely
unasked, Form 990 needed sweeping changes.35 To this end, the IRS
added a category of “key employees” whose identity and
compensation must be reported.36 Further, Part VI of Form 990 was
amended to ask a series of questions meant to incentivize boards to
adopt good governance best practices.37 For example, the form now
requires management to disclose the number of voting members on
the governing body and how many are independent.38 The form

31. Coverdale, supra note 19, at 821–22.
32. See id.; Fishman, supra note 26, at 566.
33. A comprehensive review of all of the changes made to Form 990 is beyond the
scope of this Recent Development. For purposes of this Recent Development, the
relevant changes were those aimed at influencing corporate governance contained in
Section VI of the form. See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
34. Allison, supra note 21, at 14 (stating that the revisions created a “dramatically new
version” of the form).
35. Id. at 15–16 (discussing the new Form 990 requirements).
36. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 24–25 (2015) [hereinafter FORM 990
INSTRUCTIONS], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEM3-PC97].
“Key Employees” as defined on Form 990 are those, other than officers, directors, or
trustees, who make over $150,000 per year, have significant responsibility or control over
the nonprofit, and are among the top twenty highest paid employees. Id. at 25.
37. Allison, supra note 21, at 16. Furthermore, “[a]t the heart of the new Form is the
assumption that good governance at the board level—coupled with the adoption,
implementation and disclosure of policies and procedures—fosters tax compliance and
promotes public confidence.” See id. at 14.
38. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990, at 6, nos. 1(a)–(b) (2015) [hereinafter
FORM 990], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XRC-3KRW]. A
board member is deemed “independent” if (1) the board member was not compensated as
an officer or other employee of the organization or of a related organization; (2) the board
member did not receive total annual compensation or other payments in excess of $10,000
as an independent contractor (other than reimbursement of expenses under an expense
reimbursement procedure) or reasonable compensation for services provided as a member
of the board; and (3) neither the board member nor any family member of the board
member was involved in an “interested persons” transaction reportable on Schedule L.
FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 36, at 64. Some examples of “Interested Persons”
include current and former officers, directors/trustees, key employees, the creator or
founder of the organization, and substantial contributors. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE L (FORM 990 OR 990-EZ) 1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov
/pub/irs-pdf/i990sl.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q56-UGQD].
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requires filers to state whether the nonprofit has a written conflict of
interest policy.39 The form also requires disclosure of whether the
nonprofit’s officers, directors and/or trustees, and key employees are
required to annually disclose potential conflicts of interest.40 Further,
filers must indicate whether the nonprofit contemporaneously
documents meetings of the board and its committees.41 Additionally,
management must disclose whether the process for determining the
compensation for the CEO and other key officers included “review
and approval by independent persons,” consideration of
compensation data for comparable positions at similar organizations,
and “contemporaneous substantiation” of deliberations and decisions
regarding compensation.42 Finally, the form requires filers to disclose
the process by which management reviewed the 990, who reviewed it,
and the extent of the review.43
While the changes made to Form 990 were extensive, the extent
to which those changes have actually impacted nonprofit governance
by reducing self-dealing and other abuses is debated. On one hand, it
seems clear that the additional disclosures the form requires probably
incentivize better behavior.44 For example, between 2005 and 2010,
the percentage of public charities with audit committees increased by
thirty percentage points.45 Further, during the same period, the
percentage of organizations with document retention and destruction
policies also increased.46 On the other hand, good governance
practices have not been implemented as broadly among certain kinds
of nonprofits, including smaller organizations,47 which serves as
evidence of 990’s inability to effect widespread change. Critics further
argue that requiring significant disclosures, rather than spurring
39. FORM 990, supra note 38, at 6, no. 12(a).
40. Id. at 6, no. 12(b).
41. Id. at 6, nos. 8(a)–(b).
42. Id. at 6, nos. 15(a)–(b). Affirmative responses will allow the nonprofit to qualify
for the rebuttable presumption that the compensation is reasonable if certain conditions
are met. FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 36, at 87.
43. FORM 990, supra note 38, at 6, nos. 11(a)–(b).
44. See generally AMY BLACKWOOD, NATHAN DIETZ & TOM POLLACK, URBAN INST.,
THE STATE OF NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE 14 (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files
/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413229-The-State-of-Nonprofit-Governance.PDF [https://perma.cc
/27XF-YCPC] (noting that “[t]he adoption of good governance practices is certainly on the
rise”).
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id. at 6. Also, while comparable 2005 data is not available, 2010 studies show that
“more than 60 percent of organizations had a compensation review and approval process
for chief executives and 46 percent of organizations had a similar process for other key
employees.” Id. at 14.
47. Id. at 9.
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II. THE INFORMATION GAPS
A. Information Gaps: Where the Public Still Cannot See
While recognizing Form 990’s likely positive overall impact on
nonprofit governance, this Recent Development asserts that greater
transparency will continue to reduce financial mismanagement in the
nonprofit sector. The current reporting requirements—embodied in
the current Form 990—still leave the public “in the dark” in at least
two ways. First, Form 990 leaves a practical gap in publicly accessible
information because information discernible from 990s is not
aggregated for comparative and other purposes.49 Second, Form 990
leaves an actual gap in publicly accessible information because the
form does not require disclosure of some relevant good governance
practices.50 The existence of these information gaps and their
implications are addressed separately.
1. Practical Gap51: How the Lack of Data Aggregation52 Obscures
Governance Practices
Data aggregation—the gathering and publishing of free,
downloadable datasets53—benefits the public by improving
comparability capabilities. Unfortunately, 990’s current reporting
requirements preclude feasible data aggregation, thereby limiting the
public’s ability to compare nonprofit governance data from one
48. See id. at 14. (“Does the required disclosure of certain governance practices lead
to better nonprofit governance, though? Is it a pathway to reflective evaluation of
governance practices for nonprofits or another way to gain legitimacy in the eyes of
government and potential donors?”). Such arguments rest on the proposition that
requiring the reporting of a practice does not necessarily ensure the practice’s
implementation.
49. See infra Section II.A.1.
50. See infra Section II.A.2.
51. For the purposes of this Recent Development, “practical gap” or “practical
information gap” refers to information that is technically available but practically
inaccessible due to systemic limitations.
52. Data aggregation is a concept similar to “open data.” Open data is defined as
“data that are available to all, free of charge, in a standard format, published without
proprietary conditions, and available online as a bulk download rather than only through
single-entry lookup.” BETH SIMONE NOVECK & DANIEL L. GOROFF, ASPEN INST.,
INFORMATION FOR IMPACT: LIBERATING NONPROFIT SECTOR DATA 2 (2013), http://
www.thegovlab.org/static/files/publications/psi_Information-for-Impact.pdf [https://perma.cc
/E5W4-PPNX].
53. Id.
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organization against similarly situated nonprofits. The IRS makes
“Forms 990 filed by exempt organizations available only as single,
individual image files specific to each exempt organization.”54 As the
Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities
(“ACT”) noted, “[t]he Form 990 data is not currently publicly
available in a comprehensive, aggregated manner. It can be used and
analyzed only on the basis of one exempt organization at a time.”55
This means that, while much information is technically available, its
utility is limited because observers cannot contextualize the data
without significant time and energy expenditures. The data, though
collected, is practically inaccessible.
The lack of data aggregation disadvantages would-be donors56
(and favors corrupt nonprofit donees) as donors attempt to determine
which organizations to philanthropically support. Imagine trying to
buy a car without being able to quickly compare prices across years,
models, and geography. While highly educated shoppers may notice
red flags without utilizing comparative tools, regular laypersons
would not be able to make fully informed decisions without first
laboriously aggregating the data. Nonprofit donors currently face this
dilemma.
The U.S. healthcare sector provides a recent example of the
benefits data aggregation can provide to the public. When the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services published its database of
hospital infection rates online in a searchable format, Microsoft and
Google created an application showing infection rates for local
hospitals across the country.57 This gave the public—from an
“investigative journalist to the parent of a sick child”—access to
information on which hospitals were the safest regarding infections.58
The parallels between the healthcare and nonprofit sectors are
easy to draw and hard to ignore. As open data allows concerned
patients to compare relevant safety measures between hospitals, so
too will data aggregation allow vigilant donors to compare similarly

54. ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & GOV’T ENTITIES, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., 2015 REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 104 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 ACT REPORT],
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege_act_rpt_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT9D-UZZQ].
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. For the purposes of this Recent Development, “donors” refers to any member of
the public who contributes money to a nonprofit. This includes those who donate money
to charities as well as those who pay nonprofits like SEANC to provide services.
57. NOVECK & GOROFF, supra note 52, at 3–4.
58. Id. at 4.
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situated nonprofits against each other.59 Data aggregation allows third
parties to turn discrete raw data into more useful, accessible
knowledge.60 By placing relevant, already-existing data into a central
repository, thousands of individual Form 990s have the potential to
become more than the sum of their parts.61
Specifically, data aggregation of information submitted on Form
990s would allow donors to quickly compare the corporate
governance practices of myriad nonprofits devoted to advancing a
particular cause.62 For example, the only way for prospective donors
to currently distinguish between the governance practices of
organizations that serve refugees, like World Relief Durham,63
Carolina Refugee Resettlement Agency,64 Church World Service,65
and many others, is to obtain each of their individual 990s,
extrapolate relevant data, and perform comparative analyses.
Unsurprisingly, many individual donors are unwilling to conduct such
exacting due diligence.66 Aggregating data should increase donor
willingness to engage in comparative analyses by increasing the
accessibility of relevant information.
In addition to greatly increasing prospective donors’ willingness
and ability to discern between nonprofits, data aggregation has the
potential to crowdsource the task of fraud detection.67 As some
commentators have explained,
Without ready access to specific information about suspicious
activity . . . there is a tendency [for the IRS] to regulate in broad
59. See id. While individual donors do not always compare nonprofits when deciding
where to donate, evidence suggests that it may not be for lack of trying. See BOB
OTTENHOFF & GREG ULRICH, MORE MONEY FOR MORE GOOD 12 fig.1-1 (2012), http://www
.guidestar.org/ViewCmsFile.aspx?ContentID=4718 [https://perma.cc/R9VH-2JBM] (noting
that each segment of donors—individuals, philanthropic advisors, and foundation
officers—conducts general research on individual nonprofits at a greater rate than they
conduct comparative research).
60. NOVECK & GOROFF, supra note 52, at 4.
61. Id.
62. A Google search of “donate to refugees in North Carolina” produces many
nonprofits within the first pages of search results. There are only limited ways to
meaningfully distinguish between the various organizations, especially for donors seeking
confirmation of good corporate governance practices.
63. WORLD RELIEF DURHAM, http://worldreliefdurham.org [https://perma.cc/72AFC49Q].
64. CAROLINA REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AGENCY, http://carolinarefugee.org
[https://perma.cc/SJA3-8U8J].
65. CWS DURHAM, http://cwsrdu.org [https://perma.cc/3JW7-VXHU].
66. See OTTENHOFF & ULRICH, supra note 59, at 12 fig.1-1 (noting that less than ten
percent of individual donors perform comparative analysis).
67. NOVECK & GOROFF, supra note 52, at 21.
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and heavy-handed strokes based mainly on anecdotes. With a
Form 990 database, identifying potential fraud could be
crowdsourced, giving the IRS and states’ Attorneys General
“more eyes and ears. Making 990 forms public enlarges the
volunteer staff of the IRS.”68
Because data aggregation would allow the public to examine
nonprofits (and their governance practices) within the context of the
entire nonprofit sector, IRS creation of open data would likely
increase the abilities of donors to detect and avoid potentially
problematic organizations.69
One significant way that nonprofit fraud detection may be
crowdsourced is through social media. Social media has already
demonstrated crowdsourcing capabilities across a broad spectrum of
areas, including disseminating developing news, launching marketing
campaigns, and tracking contagious diseases.70 Further, commentators
have noted social media’s ability to detect and warn about credit card
and other financial fraud.71 Essentially, by pulling real-time tweets
containing fraud-related words (from a predetermined list of key
“trigger” words) and correlating that data with information in
financial transaction databases, analysts can identify anomalous
financial transactions.72 Aggregating data may allow fraud detection
regarding nonprofit abnormalities to be similarly crowdsourced.
2. An Actual Information Gap: The Unasked Questions
While aggregating data will likely enhance public knowledge of
nonprofit governance and improve fraud detection capabilities, data
aggregation alone is insufficient to illuminate all problematic
nonprofit governance practices. As previously discussed, Form 990’s
Part VI contains several governance-related “yes-or-no” questions.73
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. For a discussion of whether data aggregation may have signaled poor governance
practices in SEANC, see infra Section III.A.4.
70. Timothy Matti, Yuntao Zhu & Kuai Xu, Financial Fraud Detection Using Social
Media Crowdsourcing, INT’L PERFORMANCE COMPUTING & COMM. CONF., 2014, at 1, 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See FORM 990, supra note 38, at 6, pt. VI. The questions in Part VI include, among
others: whether any officer, director or key employee has a family or business relationship
with any other officer, director, or employee; whether the organization has become aware
of any significant changes to governing documents; whether the organization provided a
copy of the 990 to all members before filing; whether there is a conflict of interest policy;
whether there is a whistleblower policy; whether there is a document retention policy; and
whether the process for determining executive compensation was subject to independent
review. Id.
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By indicating what the IRS perceives as the most desirable practices,74
these questions send strong signals about the kinds of procedures the
IRS—and the public—care about.75 It follows that practices not asked
about will likely be perceived as less important. Unfortunately, the
form neglects to ask about some important practices.
For example, Form 990 fails to ask about the frequency of board
meetings.76 Further, Form 990 does not ask whether an organization
participated in transactions with a related entity, whether an
organization has an audit committee, or the percentage of
independent directors.77 As 990’s 2008 enhancement and its aftermath
illustrate, asking about these kinds of practices would likely further
increase good governance adoption rates.78
In sum, the current 990 provides the public with helpful
information.79 Unfortunately, the lack of data aggregation limits the
ultimate utility of this information.80 Further, while 990’s inquiries are
helpful, some important questions remain unasked.81 Until the IRS
aggregates the data and asks further questions,82 nonprofit
governance practices will remain partially obscured.

74. Id. It should be noted, however, that some might consider the “one size fits all”
approach that Form 990 seems to take to be haphazard and inefficient. See 2015 ACT
REPORT, supra note 54, at 91.
75. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 1205 n.113.
76. The frequency of board meetings is an important metric because it may indicate
how closely nonprofit management follows corporate formalities. While Form 990 asks
whether meetings or written actions were documented, FORM 990, supra note 38, at 6, no.
8, management is not required to report how often they deliberate. Information regarding
meeting frequency may be located in other places, such as an organization’s bylaws.
However, it seems unlikely that an average layperson would have the expertise or desire
to locate that information absent extenuating circumstances.
77. While the form asks about the number of independent directors, it does not ask
about the percentage of independent directors, thereby missing an opportunity to
communicate about board makeup expectations. FORM 990, supra note 38, at 6, nos. 1(a)–
(b). Admittedly, because simple math allows one to ascertain the percentage of
independent directors from a current 990, the primary benefit of inquiring about the
percentage of independent directors would not derive from the creation of new
information. Rather, asking about the percentage of independent directors would more
clearly communicate to nonprofit leaders what the IRS perceives as a best practice and
would likely result in an increased number of boards with optimal numbers of
independent directors.
78. For an example of the effect official inquiry can have on governance adoption
rates, see BLACKWOOD ET AL., supra note 44, at 6 (noting that between 2005 and 2010,
the number of public charities with conflict of interest policies increased by twelve
percentage points).
79. See supra Section I.B.
80. See supra Section II.A.1.
81. See supra Section II.A.2.
82. See discussion infra Sections III.A.1.
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III. SOLUTIONS
Solutions are aimed at closing two information gaps: practical
and actual. After discussing the roles various actors may play in
shrinking the practical information gap, this Recent Development
examines what difference, if any, the proposed solutions would have
made in the SEANC scandal. Similarly, after examining ways that
relevant actors may close the actual information gap, this Recent
Development applies those solutions to the unfortunate facts of the
SEANC scandal.
A. Filling the Practical Information Gap: How Data Aggregation
Parts the Clouds
Shrinking the practical information gap is a conundrum with
multiple solutions. First, the practical gap could be closed by direct
action from the IRS.83 State attorneys general could also alleviate the
data aggregation problem.84 Private sector solutions are also briefly
considered.85
1. What the IRS Can Do to Aggregate Data
The most comprehensive solution to the data aggregation
problem is likely attainable only through IRS action. As the ACT’s
2015 Report on Recommendations86 recognized, the highest-impact
proposal involves (1) requiring all tax-exempt organizations to file all
Form 990 series electronically,87 and (2) mandating that the IRS make
83. See infra Section III.A.1.
84. See infra Section III.A.2.
85. See infra Section III.A.3.
86. 2015 ACT REPORT, supra note 54.
87. Id. at 107. Organizations must file various versions of Form 990 depending on
their size or purpose. The ACT Report explained by stating the following:
The forms that most tax-exempt organizations must use to comply with the annual
information return requirement are the Form 990 (Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax), Form 990-EZ (Short Form Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax) or (more recently) Form 990-N (e-Postcard). Certain
tax-exempt organizations are subject to special return filing requirements. Private
foundations submit their information to the IRS on a Form 990-PF (Return of
Private Foundation). Black lung benefit trusts described in Section 501(c)(21) use
Form 990-BL (Information and Initial Excise Tax Return for Black Lung Trusts
and Certain Related Persons), religious or apostolic organizations described in
Section 501(d) use Form 1065 (U.S. Return of Partnership Income) and stock
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trusts qualifying under Section 401 use Form
5500 (Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan). Exempt organizations
separately report their unrelated business income on a Form 990-T (Exempt
Organization Business Income Tax Return).
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the “electronically filed forms publicly available in a machinereadable format in a timely manner.”88
Because some nonprofits continue to manually file Form 990s89
and the IRS lacks the resources to manually extract all reported data,
the first step toward comprehensive data aggregation—and eventually
open data—should be to require e-filing. As the ACT Report notes,
requiring e-filing makes data mining a much simpler and less laborintensive process.90 Once the data has been aggregated in a central
repository, the next step is to make the data publicly available in a
machine-readable format.91 Making existing nonprofit governance
data publicly available in a readable, searchable format would make
the data truly open and potentially transformative.92
While this Recent Development asserts that the abovementioned proposal is the most comprehensive solution to filling the
practical information gap, it recognizes that changes of such a
sweeping nature are seldom quickly realized. In the meantime, other,
more intermediate solutions can provide the public with greater
access to information than they currently possess.

Id. at 92. For the purposes of this Recent Development, the distinctions between the basic
990 and other forms are of little importance.
88. Id. at 111. The proposal further lists advantages to mandatory Form 990 e-filing,
including:
use of the publicly available data by donors to make more informed contribution
decisions, use by researchers, analysts and entrepreneurs to better understand the
exempt organizations sector, and the creation of information tools and services to
meet the needs of the sector, and also notes the usefulness of the data by state and
local regulators, charity watch-dog groups, charitable beneficiaries and the press.
According to the President’s proposal, requiring electronic filing is unlikely to
impose a large burden on tax-exempt organizations, since they generally maintain
financial records in electronic form and either hire a tax professional or selfprepare returns using tax preparation software that enables electronic filing. The
proposal states that in many cases, electronic filing is more cost effective for
taxpayers.
Id.
89. Id. at 97–98.
90. Id. at 107. The ACT Report states, “With all-electronic filing, the IRS could
search and utilize all the information reported on the Form 990, not just what is manually
entered from the paper forms.” Id. As of today, “the IRS Exempt Organizations division
only utilizes from the electronically filed returns the same information that is manually
transcribed from the paper returns for its data analytics functions, for parity reasons.” Id.
Mandatory e-filing will allow the IRS to utilize more data.
91. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
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2. What North Carolina Can Do to Aggregate Data
North Carolina can take an incremental step toward open data
by joining with states already engaged in the data aggregation
process. To that end, North Carolina should join a consortium of
states93 currently supporting the Multistate Registration and Filing
Portal (“MRFP”).94 In addition to maximizing efficiency, data
transparency, and information sharing, the MRFP aims to reduce
duplication of efforts and increase publicly accessible information by
“mak[ing] the collected data available to the public in a searchable
and interactive format.”95 Because some targeted information regards
varying state registration requirements, participation in the MRFP
requires state attorney general engagement and cooperation.96 While
MRFP necessarily lacks the breadth of a potential IRS database, its
information would not lack in depth, as all data submitted on Form
990s within participating states would be available.97 Further, as the
ACT noted, the MRFP “may provide an opportunity to work more
closely with the IRS on collection of basic data about nonprofit
organizations.”98 Clearly, any state participation in MRFP-like
initiatives is a step toward greater transparency—a step into the light.
3. Help from the Private Sector: Watchdog Sites and Data
Aggregation
Another solution—albeit an imperfect one—to the data
aggregation problem is to reconsider watchdog sites’ reporting
practices.99 Charity Navigator, a widely used and respected site,100
contains relevant information—including governance-related answers

93. The states belonging to the consortium are Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, and Tennessee. About, MULTISTATE REGISTRATION AND FILING
PORTAL, http://mrfpinc.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/3ANC-QK65].
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 2015 ACT REPORT, supra note 54, at 101.
99. Watchdog groups use different criteria to “grade” various nonprofits. For
example, Charity Navigator uses tax returns to focus on financial health, accountability
and transparency. Overview, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org
/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=17#.VuCDrxi5BB8 [https://perma.cc/ULV3-BZ9E].
100. According to its own website, Charity Navigator is “America’s largest and most
influential charity evaluator.” Where We Are Headed: CN 3.0, CHARITY NAVIGATOR,
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1193#.Vs0j1Ri5BB8
[https://perma.cc/LL45-XNJG]. It had “over 9 million visits to [the] web site in 2015 alone
and impact[s] at least $10 billion of charitable donations each year.” Id.

95 N.C. L. REV. 235 (2016)

250

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

from Part VI of Form 990—in relatively accessible pages.101
Unfortunately, but understandably, the site does not aggregate the
data.102 More problematically, at least for the purposes of this Recent
Development, Charity Navigator only reports on 501(c)(3)s.103 This
means that organizations like SEANC, a 501(c)(5), often escape
meaningful third-party reporting of their governance practices.104
It is not entirely clear how watchdog sites should improve access
to nonprofit governance information. Sites like Charity Navigator
may consider aggregating the existing data in more comprehensive
ways.105 Such aggregation, however incomplete, would significantly
improve public access to relevant governance-related information.106
However, absent changing site missions107 or improving incentives for
watchdog sites to aggregate, they have little reason to change the
status quo. Further, even if watchdog sites aggregate the data they
already collect, it appears that leaving the task of data aggregation
101. See, e.g., American Breast Cancer Foundation, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www
.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=8004#.Vs0leRi5BB8 [https://
perma.cc/JR6C-HS57] (denoting whether the American Breast Cancer Foundation complied
with many of the inquiries listed in Part VI of Form 990).
102. It should be noted, however, that Charity Navigator allows site visitors, using a
“compare” feature available for free, to select certain nonprofits for comparison against
others. See id. However, because many organizations do not meet Charity Navigator’s
requirements for rating eligibility, Charity Navigator’s comparability capabilities are
significantly limited. Id.
103. See, e.g., State Employees Association of North Carolina Inc, CHARITY
N AVIGATOR , http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.profile&ein
=200223349#.Vs0nHhi5BB9 [https://perma.cc/9KRZ-UDPC] (denoting that data is
unavailable for the State Employees Association of North Carolina because it is not a
501(c)(3) organization).
104. The Better Business Bureau (“BBB”), while reporting on all kinds of nonprofit
(and for-profit) organizations, uses criteria for rating organizations that shed virtually no
light on governance issues. Overview of BBB Rating, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://
www.bbb.org/council/overview-of-bbb-grade/ [https://perma.cc/7V7X-HPB6] (noting the
only factors taken into consideration relating to transparency are whether the organization
provides information about the products and services it offers, whether the organization
provides ownership information, and whether the organization “uses a false address or an
address cannot be determined”). Hence, BBB’s report on SEANC provides an “A+”
based on, among other things, the lack of customer complaints and the overall customer
experience. State Employees Association of North Carolina, Inc., BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://
www.bbb.org/raleigh-durham/business-reviews/professional-organizations/state-employeesassociation-of-north-carolina-in-raleigh-nc-90002621#reasonrating [https://perma.cc/JB28YHKA].
105. For example, watchdog sites could provide the data they collect in downloadable
format.
106. If Charity Navigator aggregated the data it currently collects, the public would
have the ability to compare corporate governance practices of many of the largest and
most popular charities in the United States.
107. For example, Charity Navigator expanding its mission to include monitoring all
types of 501(c) entities would be considered a changed site mission.
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solely up to watchdog sites will prove to be an inefficient and
relatively unsuccessful venture because no watchdog site
comprehensively collects nonprofit data.
4. The Potential Impact of Data Aggregation in the SEANC Scandal
Whether coming via the IRS, the MRFP, or watchdog sites, data
aggregation could have made a meaningful difference in the SEANC
scandal.108 To analyze data aggregation’s effect, this Recent
Development examines Part VI of three recent SEANC 990s.109
Interestingly, the form was never presented to all members of its
governing body before submission.110 Further, the only information
about the “process” by which the form was reviewed consisted of the
following: “A COPY OF THE FORM IS REVIEWED AND
SIGNED BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR PRIOR TO

108. For data aggregation to meaningfully improve governance, the public needs to
care about the data. SEANC’s status as a 501(c)(5) (instead of a 501(c)(3)) precludes the
possibility of tax-deductible donor contributions. Such non-501(c)(3) status, however,
should not be seen as signaling either a lack of widespread interest in SEANC’s
governance structures or that the public is only interested in nonprofit governance
practices of bona fide 501(c)(3) charities. Indeed, such an assertion begs the conclusion
that those who pay nonprofits for services are somehow less invested with how their
money is spent than are donors who give to charities. With both traditional charities and
organizations like SEANC, those providing money to the organization have an interest in
governance practices. For organizations like SEANC, with over 50,000 members,
Welcome, SEANC, http://www.seanc.org/about/welcome/ [https://perma.cc/GX85-662M],
the interest in governance practices is likely quite robust. Hence, all kinds of nonprofits—
not just charities—would benefit from data aggregation.
109. State Emp. Ass’n of N.C. Inc., IRS Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, at 6, pt. VI (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2013) [hereinafter 2013 SEANC
Form 990]; State Emp. Ass’n of N.C. Inc., IRS Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, at 6, pt. VI (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2012) [hereinafter 2012 SEANC
Form 990]; State Emp. Ass’n of N.C. Inc., IRS Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, at 6, pt. VI (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011) [hereinafter 2011 SEANC
Form 990]. These forms are from the years when Cope allegedly self-dealt.
110. 2013 SEANC Form 990, supra note 109, at 6, no. 11(a); 2012 SEANC Form 990,
supra note 109, at 6, no. 11(a); 2011 SEANC Form 990, supra note 109, at 6, no. 11(a).
Interestingly, it appears SEANC filed two separate returns for each of the years
referenced, an individual and a group return representing its subordinates. While
SEANC’s Form 990s state that the form was never presented to the members of its
governing body, the group returns do. State Emp. Ass’n of N.C.—Group Return, IRS
Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax at 6, no. 11(a) (OMB No.
1545-0047) (2013); State Emp. Ass’n of N.C.-Group Return, IRS Form 990: Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax at 6, no. 11(a) (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2012); State
Emp. Ass’n of N.C.-Group Return, IRS Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax at 6, no. 11(a) (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011). At the very least, the
discrepancies between these two sets of documents raise concerns regarding the level of
oversight, or lack thereof, which went into preparing them.
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FILING.”111 Of course, when the executive director is also the one
stealing from the company, the director’s unilateral review of Form
990 is an exercise in futility. If, however, the data had been
aggregated, the problematic pattern (of no independent review of the
form) may have been detected.112
To summarize, and as the SEANC anecdote suggests, providing
open, aggregated nonprofit data will likely aid the public in detecting
poor governance practices. The IRS is best suited for the important
task of data aggregation. State charity officials also have significant
power to help and may be able to aggregate data within a given state
or series of states. However, leaving data aggregation entirely up to
third parties will likely continue to prove ineffective.
B.

Filling the Actual Information Gap: How Additional Disclosures
Part the Clouds

While the SEANC scandal indicates that open data will aid in
fraud detection, it also suggests that merely aggregating existing data
may not be enough to detect poor nonprofit governance in some
cases. Hence, in addition to data aggregation, which primarily has
detection implications,113 North Carolina should consider increasing
the disclosures required by certain kinds of nonprofits.114 As some
states have already realized,115 increasing disclosure requirements
may improve both detection and deterrence.
1. Additional Disclosures Vigilant States Require
Florida, in addition to requiring nonprofits to file Form 990 and
an annual report with its secretary of state,116 requires organizations
111. 2013 SEANC Form 990, supra note 109, sched. O; 2012 SEANC Form 990, supra
note 109, sched. O; 2011 SEANC Form 990, supra note 109, sched. O.
112. Of course, hindsight clarifies past mistakes in ways that are rarely obvious at the
time they were committed. Much of the information contained in SEANC’s 990s is typical
and may not have raised red flags.
113. The current required 990 disclosures have deterrent effects as well; it is just that
much of the impact of those deterrent effects is already being realized. However, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that data aggregation of current 990s may have some marginal
deterrent effect as well. Because such an effect is tenuous and likely insignificant, this
Recent Development focuses on data aggregation’s more concrete, predictable detection
impact.
114. See infra Section III.B.2.
115. See infra Section III.B.1.
116. Annual Report Overview (Part I) and Step-By-Step Filing Instructions (Part II),
FLA. DEP’T STATE, https://efile.sunbiz.org/sbs_ar_instr.html [https://perma.cc/R9FV-TBH7].
However, the report contains little more than basic organizational information, such as the
organization’s principal place of business, mailing address, and basic contact information
for its registered agents. Id.
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soliciting funds within the state to file another annual report with the
Florida Department of Agriculture and Human Services.117 This more
comprehensive report requires disclosure of persons authorized to
write checks on behalf of the organization,118 a certificate signed by all
directors, officers, and trustees of the corporation evidencing their
knowledge of and compliance with the organization’s conflict of
interest policy,119 and independent CPA audits for organizations
receiving over $1,000,000 in annual contributions,120 among other
requirements. Similarly, New Hampshire, in addition to requiring
Form 990 filings to the IRS, requires the 990 and an additional annual
report to be filed with the state attorney general.121 This additional
report also requires an appendix containing information about
“conflicts of interest and pecuniary benefit transactions.”122 Further,
the report must be signed under oath by someone other than the
executive director, preferably the treasurer or board chair.123
North Carolina’s nonprofit reporting requirements are somewhat
less exacting than Florida and New Hampshire’s. While North
Carolina law requires charities soliciting funds to annually file an

117. FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., SOLICITATION OF
CONTRIBUTIONS REGISTRATION APPLICATION, at ii, http://forms.freshfromflorida.com
/10100.pdf [http://perma.cc/VK9U-3THX].
118. See id. at 3, no. 10 (“List the name, address, and telephone number(s) of person(s)
responsible for the custody and final distribution of contributions . . . .”).
119. Id. at 6, no. 25; see also FLA. STAT. § 496.4055(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d
Reg. Sess.) (“The board of directors, or an authorized committee thereof, of a charitable
organization or sponsor required to register with the department under § 496.405 shall
adopt a policy regarding conflict of interest transactions. The policy shall require annual
certification of compliance with the policy by all directors, officers, and trustees of the
charitable organization. A copy of the annual certification shall be submitted to the
[Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services].”).
120. FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., supra note 117, at 6, no. 27. If a
charitable organization receives at least $500,000, but less than $1,000,000, the
organization must have a CPA review the financial statement, not necessarily audit it. Id.
121. N.H. ATT’Y GEN. CHARITABLE TR. UNIT, ANNUAL REPORT INSTRUCTIONS,
http://doj.nh.gov/charitable-trusts/documents/nhct-2a-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/S8NL-HP83]
(“Mail all materials to Charitable Trusts Unit, Department of Justice, 33 Capitol St.,
Concord, NH 03301.”).
122. Id. This requirement is more exacting than the conflict of interest disclosure
required by the current Form 990. While the current 990 requires disclosure of whether the
organization has a conflict of interest policy, the New Hampshire form requires descriptive
disclosures. N.H. ATT’Y GEN. CHARITABLE TR. UNIT, APPENDIX TO ANNUAL REPORT,
http://www.doj.nh.gov/charitable-trusts/documents/annual-report-appendix.pdf [https://perma
.cc/RA7E-YT9G].
123. N.H. ATT’Y GEN. CHARITABLE TR. UNIT, ANNUAL REPORT CERTIFICATE,
http://doj.nh.gov/charitable-trusts/documents/nhct-2a-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/S8NL-HP83]
(stating that “THE SIGNATURE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE”).
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additional form,124 the form focuses on solicitation practices without
asking other governance-centric questions.125 Further, non-501(c)(3)
nonprofits are not statutorily required to file an annual state report at
all.126 These things ought not to be. Instead, as previously discussed,
requiring certain kinds of nonprofits to file annual reports with a state
entity increases the state’s ability to detect fraud and sends strong
signals about acceptable behavior.
2. How North Carolina Could Close the Actual Information Gap
By borrowing ideas from particularly vigilant states, North
Carolina can increase public knowledge of nonprofit practices by
requiring certain groups of nonprofits to file a simple but exacting
annual report. While it is unclear exactly how such a report should be
structured, it should inquire about a few basic practices, including the
percentage of independent directors, the frequency of board
meetings, and transactions with related entities.127 Like Florida, North
Carolina should require annual certification of conflict of interest
policy compliance—not just a check mark indicating whether one
124. See N.C. DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, SOLICITATION LICENSE APPLICATION
CHARITABLE OR SPONSOR ORGANIZATION INSTRUCTIONS, https://www.sosnc.gov/CSL
/pdf/CSLCharityLicenseInstructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/D98R-2L5T].
125. See id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-16-20(a) (2015) (“Except as provided in
the articles of incorporation or bylaws of a charitable or religious corporation, a
corporation upon written demand from a member shall furnish that member its latest
annual financial statements . . . .”). Nowhere does North Carolina require nonprofits to file
an annual report detailing governance practices.
126. See § 55A-16-01(b) (stating that nonprofit organizations “shall maintain
appropriate accounting records”) (emphasis added); id. § 55A-16-24(a) (2015) (stating that
organizations, including non-501(c)(3)s, receiving more than $5,000 from public funds
each year, must disclose financial statements “upon written demand from any member of
the public”). However, absent a request from a member of the public to an organization
receiving more than $5,000 annually from public funds, North Carolina does not as a
matter of law require non-501(c) nonprofits to annually file a report with the state. Of
course, such organizations are still responsible to the IRS and must file 990s. See N.C.
DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, INCORPORATING YOUR NONPROFIT IN NORTH
CAROLINA
11–12,
https://www.sosnc.gov/corporations/pdf/nonprofitcorporation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZHM2-UC9K] (“When a corporation is incorporated or domesticated in
this state, the N.C. Department of the Secretary of State will automatically notify the
North Carolina Department of Revenue. Then the Department of Revenue will send a
letter of notification to the corporation. Along with the letter there will be a six-part
questionnaire (Form CD-345) to be used for determination of tax status. The corporation
should submit, along with the questionnaire, a copy of its Articles of Incorporation
(including, if applicable, any tax exempt organization provisions) and bylaws. The
Department of Revenue will then evaluate the documents and notify the corporation by
mail as to whether it will be exempt from franchise and income taxes.”). In other words,
after a non-501(c)(3) North Carolina organization obtains tax-exempt status, there is no
automatic annual state reporting requirement. Id.
127. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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exists.128 Following New Hampshire, North Carolina’s annual report
should disallow unilateral approval by the executive director as a
matter of policy.129 By combining the best ideas from proactive states
into a single, governance-focused form, North Carolina will increase
public fraud detection capabilities and further promulgate good
governance practices.
3. The Effect of an Annual Report on the SEANC Scandal: Would It
Have Made a Difference?
The requirement of an additional annual report similar to one
discussed above would likely have made a positive difference in the
SEANC scandal. First, an annual report requiring review by someone
other than the executive director would have precluded Cope’s
impotent inspection.130 Further, a report requiring a bona fide
description of the organization’s conflict of interest policy would have
forced SEANC to be more explicit about its procedures and may have
alerted other stakeholders that something was amiss.131 While the
exact disclosures required necessarily depend on the form and
substance of the proposed report, it does not strain credulity to assert
that nearly any additional governance-centric annual reporting
requirement would have decreased the likelihood of Cope’s abuses.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Counterarguments
While most agree that increased nonprofit governance
transparency is a worthy aim, some remain skeptical about the
feasibility of increasing public access to relevant information. These
critics generally argue that enacting some of the changes this Recent
Development espouses will be prohibitively costly, woefully
ineffective, or both.132 For example, some critics of data aggregation
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. While Form 990 certainly encourages
conflict of interest policies, it does not require them.
129. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
131. In the SEANC 990s, the only information about the conflict of interest policy is a
disclosure that governing members are required to submit conflict disclosures and that the
organization’s contracts are reviewed by the organization’s ethics officer. 2013 SEANC
Form 990, supra note 109, sched. O; 2012 SEANC Form 990, supra note 109, sched. O;
2011 SEANC Form 990, supra note 109, sched. O.
132. While the most commonly referenced costs are the pecuniary costs of database
implementation, some argue that usurpation of directors’ business judgment may also be
considered a “cost.” See Donnelly, supra note 22, at 181; see also 2008 ACT REPORT,
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assert that the IRS, and state governments, lacks the economic
resources to create a central, searchable repository133 and that
relevant nonprofits lack the resources to adopt additional reporting
reforms.134 On the other hand, critics of enhanced reporting
requirements urge that—in addition to being prohibitively
expensive—enhancing reporting requirements further constrains
nonprofit boards and ultimately diminishes their business judgment
without actually changing director behavior.135 These arguments are
taken in turn.
1. The Costs of Data Aggregation: A Price Too High to Pay?
Two costs are relevant regarding data aggregation: the IRS’s cost
to create and maintain a searchable database and individual
nonprofits’ costs to prepare and electronically file Form 990 reports.
First, data aggregation is likely not too costly for the IRS because,
while creating an open database would incur one-time setup and
perpetual maintenance costs, it would also reduce data conversion
and quality assurance costs by an estimated combined $600,000
annually.136 However, as commentators have noted, the front-end
costs associated with data aggregation have to this point been
significant enough to deter congressional action, the long-term
benefits of data aggregation notwithstanding.137 Hence, the IRS’s lack
of immediate additional resources required to fund data aggregation

supra note 22, at 4 (listing reasons why the IRS should proceed with caution when
examining nonprofit governance).
133. NOVECK & GOROFF, supra note 52, at 27 (“In the current economic climate,
spending any additional resources on digitizing or extracting data relating to nonprofit
entities might be hard to justify without specific direction from Congress. Resources to
digitize or extract data have not been appropriated. In fact, interviewees repeatedly stated
that the IRS could not undertake such efforts under current circumstances because they
would incur new costs.”).
134. 2008 ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that because “smaller and more
rural organizations have less governance resources available to them, there is a greater
need to tread lightly because of the burdens flowing from encouraging unnecessarily
extensive governance reforms”).
135. See id. at 1 (noting that “[c]harities can feel pressured to adopt the specified
practices, even where it is inadvisable in their situation, because they believe the IRS or
others will consider them poorly governed if they fail to do so. This then can
effectively . . . divert their attention to proxies for governance instead of actual governance”
(emphasis added)); Donnelly, supra note 22, at 181.
136. 2015 ACT REPORT, supra note 54, at 107 (citing NOVECK & GOROFF, supra note
52, at 18) (stating that “[t]he Aspen Institute reports that if the IRS makes e-filed data
available in open form, it would save $350,000 in the cost of data conversion and $250,000
from a reduced need to conduct quality assurance checks”).
137. See NOVECK & GOROFF, supra note 52, at 27.

95 N.C. L. REV. 235 (2016)

2016]

NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE

257

continue to prevent congressional action, even though data
aggregation may actually pay for itself in the long run.
The second cost associated with data aggregation—nonprofits’
costs in preparing and e-filing Form 990 reports—is also unlikely to
create unbearable costs for nonprofits because “they generally
maintain financial records in electronic form and either hire a tax
professional or self-prepare returns using tax preparation software
that enables electronic filing.”138 The ACT Report further states “in
many cases, electronic filing is more cost effective for taxpayers.”139
For these reasons, data aggregation’s price tag is well within IRS and
nonprofit budgets.
2. The Costs of an Additional Annual Report
Even if some critics concede that requiring all nonprofits to e-file
may not significantly increase costs, many of them note that
mandating an additional annual report will inevitably do so.140 This is
at least a partially meritorious claim: requiring more information will
require greater preparation costs. However, the increased cost may be
justified by requiring additional reports only from nonprofits with
revenues over a given figure.141 A minimum revenue threshold
requirement would ensure that only nonprofits with the resources to
pay would be subject to additional scrutiny. Further, the increased
costs of filing an additional annual report will likely be marginal
because nonprofits already incur expenses related to their 990
information-gathering and reporting obligations.142

138. 2015 ACT REPORT, supra note 54, at 111.
139. Id.
140. See 2008 ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that the proposed changes in
Form 990 would add annual costs to nonprofits).
141. The IRS already sorts nonprofits according to income. Which Forms do Exempt
Organizations File?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits
/form-990-series-which-forms-do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in [https://perma.cc
/ZWL2-QPCX]. While more research is required to determine the optimal minimal
revenue threshold for requiring additional annual reports, this Recent Development
suggests that the threshold be no less than $1 million.
142. Because many nonprofits already hire professionals to aid in annual filing, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that, for most affected nonprofits, the additional costs imposed
by an additional annual governance report will be negligible. See generally 2015 ACT
REPORT, supra note 54, at 125 (concluding that most nonprofits already hire professionals
to prepare and file reports).
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3. Do the Proposed Recommendations Usurp Directors’ Business
Judgment?
Another argument against increased reporting requirements is
that such requirements, in effect, coerce directors into adopting
practices that may or may not be best for their organizations.143 As
others have noted, enhancing reporting requirements simply “gives
board members new incentives to adopt best practices.”144 Such
propositions highlight the difference between requiring the reporting
of a practice and the implementation of a practice. Because most of
the proposed changes145 constitute the former proposition, adopting
them will not usurp directors’ business judgment. However, the same
cannot be said regarding recommendations mandating the adoption
of good governance practices.
Recommendations mandating director action (or inaction)
necessarily implicate directors’ business judgment. For example, the
recommendations to disallow unilateral executive director approval
of a Form 990 or similar report146 and to require annual filing of a
certificate signed by all directors evidencing compliance with a
conflict of interest policy147 technically usurp directors’ business
judgment to some degree because they force management to make
certain business decisions. These and other similar proposed
requirements remove director autonomy regarding a very narrow set
of choices. Despite their restricting effect, this Recent Development
posits that such recommendations are nevertheless appropriate in
light of ongoing abuses and minimal actual judgment usurpation. In
reality, how disruptive is the requirement to have at least two people
review a 990? How much judgment is actually “usurped” by requiring
large nonprofits to have and report on a conflict of interest policy? As
Cope’s crimes clarify, the benefits of implementing these kinds of
requirements will likely far outweigh any judgment usurpation
“costs.”

143. 2008 ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
144. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate
Directors—Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1857 (2012).
145. Specifically, data aggregation and any inquiry that asks whether a practice occurs
do not directly usurp directors’ business judgment.
146. See supra Section III.B.2. The same can be said of the proposed North Carolina
mandate to actually annually file a conflict of interest policy with the state Attorney
General.
147. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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CONCLUSION
This Recent Development has argued that shrinking the public’s
practical and actual information gaps will reduce instances of poor
nonprofit governance by “shedding light” on previously obscured or
nonexistent data. The practical information gap is most effectively
addressed via IRS creation of a searchable Form 990 database. To the
extent possible, North Carolina legislators should support proposals
mandating Form 990 e-filing.148 The actual information gap is most
properly addressed via state requirements of additional annual
reports for relatively large nonprofits. North Carolina should follow
the examples of watchful states that currently require annual
governance-focused reports.
Sunlight is the best of disinfectants, and with the new Form 990,
the clouds obscuring nonprofit governance practices continued to
part. Adopting this Recent Development’s recommendations will
shed further light on nonprofit governance by increasing the public’s
access to aggregated information, which will in turn strengthen
nonprofit decision-makers’ incentives to adopt and adhere to
appropriate governance practices. On nonprofit governance, the sun
will shine all the brighter.
JORDAN C. HILTON**

148. A recent proposal from the IRS Advisory Committee is to
support a Congressional mandate to require electronic filing of the Form 990
series and . . . take interim steps to encourage and provide incentives for voluntary
e-filing of the Form 990 series for exempt organizations that are not subject to the
mandatory e-filing requirements. The IRS should recommend to the Department
of Treasury the elimination of the $10 million asset threshold for electronic filing
of the Form 990 found in the Code Section 6011 regulations.
2015 ACT REPORT, supra note 54, at 141.
** I am thankful to Sam Hipps, Michael Jones, and Professor Thomas Hazen for
their thoughtful comments and guidance throughout the editing process.
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